摘要
Virtue, as a tendency toward goodness, has an interrelated structure made up of a stable disposition of intentions and emotions on the one hand and the ability to make rational analysis and obtain moral knowledge on the other. All these elements of knowing, feeling, and willing in the structure of virtue cannot be fully understood merely from a psychological perspective. Emotion, will, and rationality in virtue always have certain moral content. Virtue, as a structure with good disposition, constitutes a moral agent and consequently an intrinsic foundation for moral practice. Of course, virtue is not a priori. On the contrary, its development is closely associated with an individual's social and historical background. Because of virtue, an agent goes beyond the rational compulsion and intended efforts into a realm of nature.
| 源语言 | 英语 |
|---|---|
| 页(从-至) | 99-110 |
| 页数 | 12 |
| 期刊 | Dao |
| 卷 | 13 |
| 期 | 1 |
| DOI | |
| 出版状态 | 已出版 - 3月 2014 |
指纹
探究 'Virtue, norm, and moral practice' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。引用此
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