摘要
This paper derives the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) transfer scheme, UI benefits, and UI contribution fees: When a worker has to earn his or her UI eligibility through work, the UI benefits do not last forever, and the UI agency has imperfect monitoring power on the strategic behavior of the worker. We show that the consideration of the UI eligibility rule generates the effective entitlement effect, which serves as an additional incentive device and alters the nature of the optimal UI transfer scheme established in literature. In contrast with previous studies, we find that when the effective entitlement effect is large, it completely removes the moral hazards in job searches, job acceptances, and job quits. As a result, the optimal UI benefits and contribution fees become constant. Calibrated to the data in the United States, the model reproduces some key features of the existing UI system.
| 源语言 | 英语 |
|---|---|
| 页(从-至) | 1586-1621 |
| 页数 | 36 |
| 期刊 | Macroeconomic Dynamics |
| 卷 | 23 |
| 期 | 4 |
| DOI | |
| 出版状态 | 已出版 - 1 6月 2019 |
联合国可持续发展目标
此成果有助于实现下列可持续发展目标:
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可持续发展目标 8 体面工作和经济增长
学术指纹
探究 'UI ELIGIBILITY RULE, MORAL HAZARD, AND OPTIMAL UNEMPLOYMENT TRANSFER SCHEME' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的学术指纹。引用此
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