Towards Personalized Privacy-Preserving Incentive for Truth Discovery in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems

Incentive mechanisms are essential for stimulating adequate worker participation to achieve good truth discovery performance in mobile crowdsensing (MCS) systems. However, most of existing incentive mechanisms only consider compensating workers' sensing cost, while the cost incurred by potential privacy leakage has been largely neglected. Moreover, none of existing privacy-preserving incentive mechanisms has incorporated workers' different privacy preferences to provide personalized payments for them. In this paper, we propose a contract-based personalized privacy-preserving incentive mechanism for truth discovery in MCS systems, named Paris-TD, which provides personalized payments for workers as a compensation for privacy cost while achieving accurate truth discovery. The basic idea is that the platform offers a set of different contracts to workers with different privacy preferences, and each worker chooses to sign a contract which specifies a privacy-preserving degree (PPD) and the corresponding payment the worker will receive if she submits perturbed data with that PPD. Specifically, we respectively design a set of optimal contracts analytically under both full and incomplete information models, which maximize the truth discovery accuracy under a given budget, while satisfying the individual rationality and incentive compatibility properties. The feasibility and effectiveness of Paris-TD are validated through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets.