State versus private ownership: Local government preferences in wind power permitting in China

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have played a significant role in China's wind power development, dominating the majority of investment in the sector. Conventional wisdom suggests that SOEs receive preferential treatment from the government, crowding out private investment and hinder fair competition and economic efficiency. However, our study finds that the picture is more complicated. We focused on wind power permitting decisions made by local governments from 2011 to 2018 — a period historically significant for addressing our research questions —and employed a qualitative and quantitative mixed-methods approach. Our analysis highlights how local governments exercise discretion in ownership selection under China's state capitalism. This study reveals that local governments' preferences for SOEs or private investors are shaped by two empirically grounded factors: corruption risks and fiscal pressures. Specifically, under the institutional configuration of this period, corruption risks increase the likelihood that local governments select SOEs when the approval of private developers is more likely to trigger corruption allegations, while fiscal pressures increase the likelihood of choosing private investors as a means of alleviating fiscal constraints. These findings contribute to the political economy of renewable energy development by showing how ownership preferences are contingent rather than fixed, and by elucidating the role of local governments in mediating state–market relations through permitting decisions.