Protecting infrastructure networks from cost-based attacks

It is well known that heterogeneous networks are vulnerable to the intentional removal of a small fraction of highly connected or loaded nodes, implying that to protect the network effectively, the important nodes should be allocated more defense resource than the others. However, if too much resource is allocated to the few important nodes, the numerous less-important nodes will be less protected, which if attacked together can still lead to devastating damage. A natural question is therefore how to efficiently distribute the limited defense resource among the network nodes such that the network damage is minimized against any attack strategy. In this paper, taking into account the factor of attack cost, the problem of network security is reconsidered in terms of efficient network defense against cost-based attacks. The results show that, for a general complex network, there exists an optimal distribution of the defense resource with which the network is best protected from cost-based attacks. Furthermore, it is found that the configuration of the optimal defense is dependent on the network parameters. Specifically, networks of larger size, sparser connection and more heterogeneous structure will more likely benefit from the defense optimization.