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Packaging for allocation

  • Peng Liu
  • , Sijia Xu*
  • *此作品的通讯作者
  • East China University of Science and Technology

科研成果: 期刊稿件 › 文章 › 同行评审

摘要

The allocation of indivisible objects is studied where individuals claim packages of them and a rule determines the number of each package to be allocated. There exists a rule satisfying feasibility, efficiency, and composition down (or composition up) if and only if the set of institutionally feasible packages is a hierarchy, i.e., for any pair of packages, either that they are disjoint or that one contains the other. Moreover, on a hierarchy, the unique rules satisfying the aforementioned properties are priority rules where a package has higher priority than another if it contains the other.

源语言英语
期刊论文编号111932
期刊Economics Letters
卷243
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 10月 2024

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