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Mixed Mean Field Games with Risk-Sensitive Cost Functionals

  • Zhixian Xin*
  • , Tao Li*
  • , Yan Chen*
  • *此作品的通讯作者
  • School Of Mathematical Science
  • East China Normal University

科研成果: 书/报告/会议事项章节 › 会议稿件 › 同行评审

摘要

We investigate a class of mean field games containing a large number of major and minor players. Each player minimizes a quadratic-tracking type risk-sensitive cost functional, where the reference signal is a function of the state average term of the major and minor players. To reduce the complexity for solving the problem, we design a sequence of decentralized strategies by the Nash certainty equivalence principle. Firstly, we apply the two-layer state aggregation method to construct the fixed-point equations for the estimations of the state average terms and give the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the fixed points. Then, we design a sequence of decentralized strategies by the estimations of the state average terms based on local information. It is shown that the estimations of the state average terms are consistent with the true values for the closed-loop systems, and the sequence of strategies designed is a decentralized asymptotic Nash equilibrium.

源语言英语
主期刊名IFAC-PapersOnLine
编辑Hideaki Ishii, Yoshio Ebihara, Jun-ichi Imura, Masaki Yamakita
出版商Elsevier B.V.
页3429-3434
页数6
版本2
ISBN(电子版)9781713872344
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 1 7月 2023
活动22nd IFAC World Congress - Yokohama, 日本
期限: 9 7月 2023 → 14 7月 2023

丛书

姓名IFAC-PapersOnLine
编号2
卷56
ISSN(电子版)2405-8963

会议

会议22nd IFAC World Congress
国家/地区日本
市Yokohama
时期9/07/23 → 14/07/23

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