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For the sustainable performance of the carbon reduction labeling policies under an evolutionary game simulation

  • Rui Zhao*
  • , Xiao Zhou
  • , Jiaojie Han
  • , Chengliang Liu
  • *此作品的通讯作者
  • Southwest Jiaotong University
  • Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

科研成果: 期刊稿件 › 文章 › 同行评审

摘要

The study proposes an evolutionary game model to investigate the possible responses of enterprises to incentive policies related to the implementation of a carbon reduction labeling scheme, such as a direct subsidy and preferential taxation rates. System dynamics is applied to simulate the created game model and we analyze two scenarios, namely the individual and combined intervention of incentive policies. A case study of China's air conditioner enterprises is then examined, with the simulation results highlighting that both a direct subsidy and preferential taxation positively influence the implementation of the carbon reduction labeling scheme. In particular, the combination of these two incentive policies is efficient compared with individual policy making. Finally, the limitations of the game theoretical analysis are discussed and future research directions are provided.

源语言英语
页(从-至)262-274
页数13
期刊Technological Forecasting and Social Change
卷112
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 1 11月 2016

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