摘要
Unionized workers are entitled to special treatment in bankruptcy court that can be detrimental to other corporate stakeholders, with unsecured creditors standing to lose the most. Using data on union elections, we employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of worker unionization on bondholders in bankruptcy states. Closely won union elections lead to significant bond value losses, especially when firms approach bankruptcy, have underfunded pension plans, and operate in non-RTW law states. Unionization is associated with longer, more convoluted, and costlier bankruptcy court proceedings. Unions depress bondholders' recovery values as they are assigned seats on creditors' committees.
| 源语言 | 英语 |
|---|---|
| 页(从-至) | 980-1013 |
| 页数 | 34 |
| 期刊 | Review of Financial Studies |
| 卷 | 31 |
| 期 | 3 |
| DOI | |
| 出版状态 | 已出版 - 1 3月 2018 |
| 已对外发布 | 是 |
指纹
探究 'Bankruptcy and the cost of organized labor: Evidence from union elections' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。引用此
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