跳到主要导航 跳到搜索 跳到主要内容

Bankruptcy and the cost of organized labor: Evidence from union elections

  • Murillo Campello
  • , Janet Gao
  • , Jiaping Qiu
  • , Yue Zhang
  • Cornell University
  • Indiana University Bloomington
  • McMaster University
  • Université catholique de Louvain

科研成果: 期刊稿件文章同行评审

摘要

Unionized workers are entitled to special treatment in bankruptcy court that can be detrimental to other corporate stakeholders, with unsecured creditors standing to lose the most. Using data on union elections, we employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of worker unionization on bondholders in bankruptcy states. Closely won union elections lead to significant bond value losses, especially when firms approach bankruptcy, have underfunded pension plans, and operate in non-RTW law states. Unionization is associated with longer, more convoluted, and costlier bankruptcy court proceedings. Unions depress bondholders' recovery values as they are assigned seats on creditors' committees.

源语言英语
页(从-至)980-1013
页数34
期刊Review of Financial Studies
31
3
DOI
出版状态已出版 - 1 3月 2018
已对外发布

指纹

探究 'Bankruptcy and the cost of organized labor: Evidence from union elections' 的科研主题。它们共同构成独一无二的指纹。

引用此