混合所有制企业高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈分析

Based on the perspective of bounded rationality? this paper first constructed a dynamic game model of dynamic cooperative behavior to explore this problem. Secondly, it discussed the impact of contract fines, government incentives, cooperation costs, and cooperation revenues on the evolution of top-management team behavior. Finally? it carried out numerical simulation and correlation analysis on its evolution process. The research shows that the final strategy of the two sides in the cooperation of the senior management team of mixed ownership enterprises will be stable in the cooperation and non-cooperation strategy? and will not be stable in the cooperation and non-cooperation strategy of one party. Among them, within a certain range, increasing the penalty of contract, increasing government incentives, reducing cooperation costs, and increasing the coefficient of cooperation revenue can promote the transformation from non-cooperation to cooperation. We hope that this study can provide some reference significance for the smooth progress of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises and form efficient institutional arrangements.