Security Proofs for Key-Alternating Ciphers with Non-Independent Round Permutations

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Abstract

This work studies the key-alternating ciphers (KACs) whose round permutations are not necessarily independent. We revisit existing security proofs for key-alternating ciphers with a single permutation (KACSPs), and extend their method to an arbitrary number of rounds. In particular, we propose new techniques that can significantly simplify the proofs, and also remove two unnatural restrictions in the known security bound of 3-round KACSP (Wu et al., Asiacrypt 2020). With these techniques, we prove the first tight security bound for t-round KACSP, which was an open problem. We stress that our techniques apply to all variants of KACs with non-independent round permutations, as well as to the standard KACs.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography - 21st International Conference, TCC 2023, Proceedings
EditorsGuy Rothblum, Hoeteck Wee
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages238-267
Number of pages30
ISBN (Print)9783031486142
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023
Event21st International conference on Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2023 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China
Duration: 29 Nov 20232 Dec 2023

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume14369 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference21st International conference on Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2023
Country/TerritoryTaiwan, Province of China
CityTaipei
Period29/11/232/12/23

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