TY - GEN
T1 - Revisiting the fairness and randomness of delegated proof of stake consensus algorithm
AU - Wang, Qi
AU - Xu, Ming
AU - Li, Xiangxue
AU - Qian, Haifeng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/12
Y1 - 2020/12
N2 - There are many disparate conceptualizations to secure a cryptocurrency network. Bitcoin relies on the proof-of-work mechanism and heterogeneous altcoins use proof-of-stake. Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS), known to be a fast, efficient, decentralized, and highly flexible blockchain design, further offers some interesting reshaping that are well worth deliberating. In DPoS consensus, a panel of trusted parties (called committee of producers in the paper) has to be established, with all of its members eligible to create blocks and prevent non-trusted parties from participating. Deterministic selection of block producers allows transactions to be confirmed in an expected average of 1 second. The paper revisits the security properties of DPoS and reinforces the fairness and randomness for the algorithm without sacrificing its performance. We first scrutinize the limitations of the DPoS consensus, including predictability of producers, bribing producers, and lack of task incentivizing. We then introduce a cascade progressive-like ranking to judge the behaviour of the producers, and the producer who does not contribute to the network at the current interaction will be committed to a lower chance of being qualified for the coming involvement. More specifically, we conceptualize the tweaking parameters and the weights for the producers and bring in the weighted committee to measure the contributions of the producers. The weighted committee is a multiset derived from the committee and the weights specify the multiplicities of the elements (the producers). A pseudo-random process is also formulated to squeeze out the producer probabilistically from the weighted committee for creating the blocks. This unpredictability of the producers amplifies the randomness of the network and gives rise to a more secure and reliable cryptocurrency system. The proposal aspires to be beneficial for practical applications and the practitioners are as well encouraged to customize case-by-case the tweaking parameters and the pseudo-random process.
AB - There are many disparate conceptualizations to secure a cryptocurrency network. Bitcoin relies on the proof-of-work mechanism and heterogeneous altcoins use proof-of-stake. Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS), known to be a fast, efficient, decentralized, and highly flexible blockchain design, further offers some interesting reshaping that are well worth deliberating. In DPoS consensus, a panel of trusted parties (called committee of producers in the paper) has to be established, with all of its members eligible to create blocks and prevent non-trusted parties from participating. Deterministic selection of block producers allows transactions to be confirmed in an expected average of 1 second. The paper revisits the security properties of DPoS and reinforces the fairness and randomness for the algorithm without sacrificing its performance. We first scrutinize the limitations of the DPoS consensus, including predictability of producers, bribing producers, and lack of task incentivizing. We then introduce a cascade progressive-like ranking to judge the behaviour of the producers, and the producer who does not contribute to the network at the current interaction will be committed to a lower chance of being qualified for the coming involvement. More specifically, we conceptualize the tweaking parameters and the weights for the producers and bring in the weighted committee to measure the contributions of the producers. The weighted committee is a multiset derived from the committee and the weights specify the multiplicities of the elements (the producers). A pseudo-random process is also formulated to squeeze out the producer probabilistically from the weighted committee for creating the blocks. This unpredictability of the producers amplifies the randomness of the network and gives rise to a more secure and reliable cryptocurrency system. The proposal aspires to be beneficial for practical applications and the practitioners are as well encouraged to customize case-by-case the tweaking parameters and the pseudo-random process.
KW - DPoS
KW - Fairness
KW - Randomness
KW - Tweaking parameters
KW - Weight
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85108025220
U2 - 10.1109/ISPA-BDCloud-SocialCom-SustainCom51426.2020.00064
DO - 10.1109/ISPA-BDCloud-SocialCom-SustainCom51426.2020.00064
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:85108025220
T3 - Proceedings - 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, 2020 IEEE International Conference on Big Data and Cloud Computing, 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Social Computing and Networking and 2020 IEEE International Conference on Sustainable Computing and Communications, ISPA-BDCloud-SocialCom-SustainCom 2020
SP - 305
EP - 312
BT - Proceedings - 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, 2020 IEEE International Conference on Big Data and Cloud Computing, 2020 IEEE International Symposium on Social Computing and Networking and 2020 IEEE International Conference on Sustainable Computing and Communications, ISPA-BDCloud-SocialCom-SustainCom 2020
A2 - Hu, Jia
A2 - Min, Geyong
A2 - Georgalas, Nektarios
A2 - Zhao, Zhiwei
A2 - Hao, Fei
A2 - Miao, Wang
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 18th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, 10th IEEE International Conference on Big Data and Cloud Computing, 13th IEEE International Symposium on Social Computing and Networking and 10th IEEE International Conference on Sustainable Computing and Communications, ISPA-BDCloud-SocialCom-SustainCom 2020
Y2 - 17 December 2020 through 19 December 2020
ER -
