Rebuttal to "on the Unforgeability of 'Privacy-Preserving Aggregation-Authentication Scheme for Safety Warning System in Fog-Cloud Based VANET"'

  • Yafang Yang
  • , Lei Zhang*
  • , Yunlei Zhao*
  • , Kim Kwang Raymond Choo
  • , Yan Zhang
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Lin recently claimed that the privacy-preserving aggregation authentication scheme (PPAAS) based on a certificateless aggregation signcryption scheme (CASS) proposed in our paper (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol.17, pp.317-331, Jan.2022) suffers from a forgery attack from type II adversary. In this paper, we show that this attack is not valid since the adversary outputs a trivial forged ciphertext. Specifically, the adversary has the master secret key and randomly selects the secret values of all users.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)10373-10374
Number of pages2
JournalIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Volume19
DOIs
StatePublished - 2024

Keywords

  • Privacy-preserving
  • certificateless aggregate signcryption
  • unforgeability

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