Abstract
Lin recently claimed that the privacy-preserving aggregation authentication scheme (PPAAS) based on a certificateless aggregation signcryption scheme (CASS) proposed in our paper (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol.17, pp.317-331, Jan.2022) suffers from a forgery attack from type II adversary. In this paper, we show that this attack is not valid since the adversary outputs a trivial forged ciphertext. Specifically, the adversary has the master secret key and randomly selects the secret values of all users.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 10373-10374 |
| Number of pages | 2 |
| Journal | IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security |
| Volume | 19 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2024 |
Keywords
- Privacy-preserving
- certificateless aggregate signcryption
- unforgeability