Provably secure certificateless one-way and two-party authenticated key agreement protocol

Lei Zhang*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

Key agreement protocols are one of the fundamental primitives in cryptography. In this paper, we formalize the security model for certificateless one-way and two-party authenticated key agreement protocols and propose a concrete certificateless one-way and two-party authenticated key agreement protocol. The security of our protocol is proven under the computational Diffie-Hellman, square computational Diffie-Hellman and gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions. As for efficiency, the protocol requires only one pass and has low communication overhead.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012 - 15th International Conference, Revised Selected Papers
Pages217-230
Number of pages14
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 28 Nov 201230 Nov 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7839 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CitySeoul
Period28/11/1230/11/12

Keywords

  • authentication
  • certificateless cryptography
  • key agreement
  • one-way

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