TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal Reinsurance-Investment Problem under a CEV Model
T2 - Stochastic Differential Game Formulation
AU - Li, Danping
AU - Chen, Ruiqing
AU - Li, Cunfang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Danping Li et al.
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - This paper focuses on a stochastic differential game played between two insurance companies, a big one and a small one. In our model, the basic claim process is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift. Both of two insurance companies purchase the reinsurance, respectively. The big company has sufficient asset to invest in the risky asset which is described by the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model and acquire new business like acting as a reinsurance company of other insurance companies, while the small company can invest in the risk-free asset and purchase reinsurance. The game studied here is zero-sum where there is a single exponential utility. The big company is trying to maximize the expected exponential utility of the terminal wealth to keep its advantage on surplus while simultaneously the small company is trying to minimize the same quantity to reduce its disadvantage. In this paper, we describe the Nash equilibrium of the game and prove a verification theorem for the exponential utility. By solving the corresponding Fleming-Bellman-Isaacs equations, we derive the optimal reinsurance and investment strategies. Furthermore, numerical examples are presented to show our results.
AB - This paper focuses on a stochastic differential game played between two insurance companies, a big one and a small one. In our model, the basic claim process is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift. Both of two insurance companies purchase the reinsurance, respectively. The big company has sufficient asset to invest in the risky asset which is described by the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model and acquire new business like acting as a reinsurance company of other insurance companies, while the small company can invest in the risk-free asset and purchase reinsurance. The game studied here is zero-sum where there is a single exponential utility. The big company is trying to maximize the expected exponential utility of the terminal wealth to keep its advantage on surplus while simultaneously the small company is trying to minimize the same quantity to reduce its disadvantage. In this paper, we describe the Nash equilibrium of the game and prove a verification theorem for the exponential utility. By solving the corresponding Fleming-Bellman-Isaacs equations, we derive the optimal reinsurance and investment strategies. Furthermore, numerical examples are presented to show our results.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85084752782
U2 - 10.1155/2020/7265121
DO - 10.1155/2020/7265121
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:85084752782
SN - 1024-123X
VL - 2020
JO - Mathematical Problems in Engineering
JF - Mathematical Problems in Engineering
M1 - 7265121
ER -