TY - GEN
T1 - Near-optimal truthful spectrum auction mechanisms with spatial and temporal reuse in wireless networks
AU - Huang, He
AU - Sun, Yu E.
AU - Li, Xiang Yang
AU - Chen, Zhili
AU - Yang, Wei
AU - Xu, Hongli
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each spectrum usage request has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. After receiving bid requests from secondary users, and possibly reserve price from primary users, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either optimize the social efficiency or optimize the revenue of the primary user. As computing an optimal conflict-free spectrum allocation is an NP-hard problem, in this work, we design near optimal spectrum allocation mechanisms separately based on the techniques: derandomized allocation from integer programming formulation, and its linear programming (LP) relaxation. We theoretically prove that 1) our derandomized allocation methods are monotone, thus, implying truthful auction mechanisms; 2) our derandomized allocation methods can achieve a social efficiency or a revenue that is at least 1 - 1/e times of the optimal respectively; Our extensive simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.
AB - In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each spectrum usage request has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. After receiving bid requests from secondary users, and possibly reserve price from primary users, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either optimize the social efficiency or optimize the revenue of the primary user. As computing an optimal conflict-free spectrum allocation is an NP-hard problem, in this work, we design near optimal spectrum allocation mechanisms separately based on the techniques: derandomized allocation from integer programming formulation, and its linear programming (LP) relaxation. We theoretically prove that 1) our derandomized allocation methods are monotone, thus, implying truthful auction mechanisms; 2) our derandomized allocation methods can achieve a social efficiency or a revenue that is at least 1 - 1/e times of the optimal respectively; Our extensive simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.
KW - Approximation mechanism
KW - Revenue
KW - Social efficiency
KW - Spectrum auction
KW - Truthful
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84882946070
U2 - 10.1145/2491288.2491313
DO - 10.1145/2491288.2491313
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:84882946070
SN - 9781450321938
T3 - Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)
SP - 237
EP - 240
BT - MobiHoc 2013 - Proceedings of the 14th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
T2 - 14th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc 2013
Y2 - 29 July 2013 through 1 August 2013
ER -