@inproceedings{b608950a76fb44adbf317dff640a4fe2,
title = "Near-optimal truthful spectrum auction mechanisms with spatial and temporal reuse in wireless networks",
abstract = "In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each spectrum usage request has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. After receiving bid requests from secondary users, and possibly reserve price from primary users, our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that will either optimize the social efficiency or optimize the revenue of the primary user. As computing an optimal conflict-free spectrum allocation is an NP-hard problem, in this work, we design near optimal spectrum allocation mechanisms separately based on the techniques: derandomized allocation from integer programming formulation, and its linear programming (LP) relaxation. We theoretically prove that 1) our derandomized allocation methods are monotone, thus, implying truthful auction mechanisms; 2) our derandomized allocation methods can achieve a social efficiency or a revenue that is at least 1 - 1/e times of the optimal respectively; Our extensive simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.",
keywords = "Approximation mechanism, Revenue, Social efficiency, Spectrum auction, Truthful",
author = "He Huang and Sun, \{Yu E.\} and Li, \{Xiang Yang\} and Zhili Chen and Wei Yang and Hongli Xu",
year = "2013",
month = jul,
day = "29",
doi = "10.1145/2491288.2491313",
language = "英语",
isbn = "9781450321938",
series = "Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc)",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",
pages = "237--240",
booktitle = "MobiHoc 2013 - Proceedings of the 14th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing",
address = "美国",
note = "14th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc 2013 ; Conference date: 29-07-2013 Through 01-08-2013",
}