TY - GEN
T1 - Modeling and Simulation of Electricity Retail Market with Oligopolistic Equilibrium Method
AU - Zhao, Chen
AU - Zhang, Shaohua
AU - Wang, Xian
AU - Li, Tao
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2019/4/10
Y1 - 2019/4/10
N2 - Establishing a competitive and efficient electricity retail market is a crucial task of the power system restructuring around the world. As most retailers have not yet entered the stage of practical selling and competition in the electricity retail market of a certain region, the retail market is akin to an oligopolistic market. To analyze the strategic bidding behaviors in the oligopolistic retail market, the Bertrand-based oligopolistic equilibrium model is built, in which the market share function is adopted to describe the relationship between the retail load and retail price, as well as differences in reputation among retailers. With the presence of a certain contract trading, bidding strategies of retailers in the retail market are studied. Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are proved. In addition, impacts of retailer's contract volume on market equilibrium outcomes are theoretically analyzed. Finally, the effectiveness of the theoretical analysis is verified by numerical examples. It is shown that the retailer's market power can be mitigated by the contract trading with consumers, which contributes to improving the efficiency of the electricity retail market.
AB - Establishing a competitive and efficient electricity retail market is a crucial task of the power system restructuring around the world. As most retailers have not yet entered the stage of practical selling and competition in the electricity retail market of a certain region, the retail market is akin to an oligopolistic market. To analyze the strategic bidding behaviors in the oligopolistic retail market, the Bertrand-based oligopolistic equilibrium model is built, in which the market share function is adopted to describe the relationship between the retail load and retail price, as well as differences in reputation among retailers. With the presence of a certain contract trading, bidding strategies of retailers in the retail market are studied. Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are proved. In addition, impacts of retailer's contract volume on market equilibrium outcomes are theoretically analyzed. Finally, the effectiveness of the theoretical analysis is verified by numerical examples. It is shown that the retailer's market power can be mitigated by the contract trading with consumers, which contributes to improving the efficiency of the electricity retail market.
KW - Bertrand competition
KW - electricity retail market
KW - equilibrium analysis
KW - retailer
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85064971349
U2 - 10.1109/CYBER.2018.8688200
DO - 10.1109/CYBER.2018.8688200
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:85064971349
T3 - 8th Annual IEEE International Conference on Cyber Technology in Automation, Control and Intelligent Systems, CYBER 2018
SP - 1478
EP - 1483
BT - 8th Annual IEEE International Conference on Cyber Technology in Automation, Control and Intelligent Systems, CYBER 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 8th Annual IEEE International Conference on Cyber Technology in Automation, Control and Intelligent Systems, CYBER 2018
Y2 - 19 July 2018 through 23 July 2018
ER -