Mixed Mean Field Games with Risk-Sensitive Cost Functionals

  • Zhixian Xin*
  • , Tao Li*
  • , Yan Chen*
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate a class of mean field games containing a large number of major and minor players. Each player minimizes a quadratic-tracking type risk-sensitive cost functional, where the reference signal is a function of the state average term of the major and minor players. To reduce the complexity for solving the problem, we design a sequence of decentralized strategies by the Nash certainty equivalence principle. Firstly, we apply the two-layer state aggregation method to construct the fixed-point equations for the estimations of the state average terms and give the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the fixed points. Then, we design a sequence of decentralized strategies by the estimations of the state average terms based on local information. It is shown that the estimations of the state average terms are consistent with the true values for the closed-loop systems, and the sequence of strategies designed is a decentralized asymptotic Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIFAC-PapersOnLine
EditorsHideaki Ishii, Yoshio Ebihara, Jun-ichi Imura, Masaki Yamakita
PublisherElsevier B.V.
Pages3429-3434
Number of pages6
Edition2
ISBN (Electronic)9781713872344
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2023
Event22nd IFAC World Congress - Yokohama, Japan
Duration: 9 Jul 202314 Jul 2023

Publication series

NameIFAC-PapersOnLine
Number2
Volume56
ISSN (Electronic)2405-8963

Conference

Conference22nd IFAC World Congress
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityYokohama
Period9/07/2314/07/23

Keywords

  • Risk-sensitive cost functional
  • decentralized asymptotic Nash equilibrium
  • decentralized strategy
  • major and minor players
  • mean field game

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