Abstract
ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol allows the sender Alice to generate a session key without interacting with receiver Bob. As a result, it is better suitable for some application scenarios than the two-pass counterpart. However, currently there are few ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocols with a security proof in a formal model. The paper investigates the ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. We propose a new ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol IDOAKE, which is shown secure under Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in the eCK model. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first provably secure ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange in the eCK model.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1153-1161 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Security and Communication Networks |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue number | 10 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2011 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- BDH assumption
- ECK model
- ID-based
- One-pass authenticated key exchange
- Trapdoor test technique