IDOAKE: Strongly secure ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol

Hai Huang, Zhenfu Cao

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol allows the sender Alice to generate a session key without interacting with receiver Bob. As a result, it is better suitable for some application scenarios than the two-pass counterpart. However, currently there are few ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocols with a security proof in a formal model. The paper investigates the ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. We propose a new ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange protocol IDOAKE, which is shown secure under Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in the eCK model. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first provably secure ID-based one-pass authenticated key exchange in the eCK model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1153-1161
Number of pages9
JournalSecurity and Communication Networks
Volume4
Issue number10
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2011
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • BDH assumption
  • ECK model
  • ID-based
  • One-pass authenticated key exchange
  • Trapdoor test technique

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