Hometown favoritism and land allocation: Evidence from China

Zhonghua Huang; Xuejun Du

doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.106431

Hometown favoritism and land allocation: Evidence from China

Zhonghua Huang, Xuejun Du

School of Public Management

Shanghai Normal University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the cause and consequences of hometown favoritism in industrial land supply, based on the dataset of Chinese land transaction and the birthplaces of Central Committee (CC) members. We find that prefecture cities have more industrial land supply when they are the hometowns of current CC members. Compared to prefecture with no CC members, prefecture with CC members has 214.05 ha more industrial land supply. Having an additional CC member in a prefecture increases the industrial land supply by 5.5 %. We find that political career concern, social ties and culture link drive hometown favoritism. Furthermore, hometown favoritism in industrial land supply can distort the location and structure of industrial land supply, and distort the efficiency of economic development.

Original language	English
Article number	106431
Journal	Land Use Policy
Volume	123
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.106431
State	Published - Dec 2022

Keywords

China
Economic development
Hometown favoritism
Industrial land
Land allocation

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.106431

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title = "Hometown favoritism and land allocation: Evidence from China",

abstract = "We study the cause and consequences of hometown favoritism in industrial land supply, based on the dataset of Chinese land transaction and the birthplaces of Central Committee (CC) members. We find that prefecture cities have more industrial land supply when they are the hometowns of current CC members. Compared to prefecture with no CC members, prefecture with CC members has 214.05 ha more industrial land supply. Having an additional CC member in a prefecture increases the industrial land supply by 5.5 \%. We find that political career concern, social ties and culture link drive hometown favoritism. Furthermore, hometown favoritism in industrial land supply can distort the location and structure of industrial land supply, and distort the efficiency of economic development.",

keywords = "China, Economic development, Hometown favoritism, Industrial land, Land allocation",

author = "Zhonghua Huang and Xuejun Du",

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year = "2022",

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T2 - Evidence from China

AU - Huang, Zhonghua

AU - Du, Xuejun

PY - 2022/12

Y1 - 2022/12

N2 - We study the cause and consequences of hometown favoritism in industrial land supply, based on the dataset of Chinese land transaction and the birthplaces of Central Committee (CC) members. We find that prefecture cities have more industrial land supply when they are the hometowns of current CC members. Compared to prefecture with no CC members, prefecture with CC members has 214.05 ha more industrial land supply. Having an additional CC member in a prefecture increases the industrial land supply by 5.5 %. We find that political career concern, social ties and culture link drive hometown favoritism. Furthermore, hometown favoritism in industrial land supply can distort the location and structure of industrial land supply, and distort the efficiency of economic development.

AB - We study the cause and consequences of hometown favoritism in industrial land supply, based on the dataset of Chinese land transaction and the birthplaces of Central Committee (CC) members. We find that prefecture cities have more industrial land supply when they are the hometowns of current CC members. Compared to prefecture with no CC members, prefecture with CC members has 214.05 ha more industrial land supply. Having an additional CC member in a prefecture increases the industrial land supply by 5.5 %. We find that political career concern, social ties and culture link drive hometown favoritism. Furthermore, hometown favoritism in industrial land supply can distort the location and structure of industrial land supply, and distort the efficiency of economic development.

KW - China

KW - Economic development

KW - Hometown favoritism

KW - Industrial land

KW - Land allocation

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85141417221

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DO - 10.1016/j.landusepol.2022.106431

M3 - 文章

AN - SCOPUS:85141417221

SN - 0264-8377

VL - 123

JO - Land Use Policy

JF - Land Use Policy

M1 - 106431

ER -

Hometown favoritism and land allocation: Evidence from China

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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