TY - JOUR
T1 - DIAVA
T2 - A Traffic-Based Framework for Detection of SQL Injection Attacks and Vulnerability Analysis of Leaked Data
AU - Gu, Haifeng
AU - Zhang, Jianning
AU - Liu, Tian
AU - Hu, Ming
AU - Zhou, Junlong
AU - Wei, Tongquan
AU - Chen, Mingsong
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 1963-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2020/3
Y1 - 2020/3
N2 - SQL injection attack (SQLIA) is among the most common security threats to web-based services that are deployed on cloud. By exploiting web software vulnerabilities, SQL injection attackers can run arbitrary malicious code on target databases to acquire or compromise sensitive data. Although web application firewalls (WAFs) are offered by most cloud service providers, tenants are reluctant to pay for them, since there are few approaches that can report accurate SQLIA statistics for their deployed services. Traditional WAFs focus on blocking suspicious SQL requests. Few of them can accurately decide whether an attack is really harmful and quickly answer how severe the attack is. To raise the tenants' awareness of the seriousness of SQLIAs, in this paper, we introduce a novel traffic-based SQLIA detection and vulnerability analysis framework named DIAVA, which can proactively send warnings to tenants promptly. By analyzing the bidirectional network traffic of SQL operations and applying our proposed multilevel regular expression model, DIAVA can accurately identify successful SQLIAs among all the suspects. Meanwhile, the severity of such SQLIAs and the vulnerabilities of the corresponding leaked data can be quickly evaluated by DIAVA based on its GPU-based dictionary attack analysis engine. Experimental results show that DIAVA not only outperforms state-of-the-art WAFs in detecting SQLAs from the perspectives of precision and recall, but also enables real-time vulnerability evaluation of leaked data caused by SQL injection.
AB - SQL injection attack (SQLIA) is among the most common security threats to web-based services that are deployed on cloud. By exploiting web software vulnerabilities, SQL injection attackers can run arbitrary malicious code on target databases to acquire or compromise sensitive data. Although web application firewalls (WAFs) are offered by most cloud service providers, tenants are reluctant to pay for them, since there are few approaches that can report accurate SQLIA statistics for their deployed services. Traditional WAFs focus on blocking suspicious SQL requests. Few of them can accurately decide whether an attack is really harmful and quickly answer how severe the attack is. To raise the tenants' awareness of the seriousness of SQLIAs, in this paper, we introduce a novel traffic-based SQLIA detection and vulnerability analysis framework named DIAVA, which can proactively send warnings to tenants promptly. By analyzing the bidirectional network traffic of SQL operations and applying our proposed multilevel regular expression model, DIAVA can accurately identify successful SQLIAs among all the suspects. Meanwhile, the severity of such SQLIAs and the vulnerabilities of the corresponding leaked data can be quickly evaluated by DIAVA based on its GPU-based dictionary attack analysis engine. Experimental results show that DIAVA not only outperforms state-of-the-art WAFs in detecting SQLAs from the perspectives of precision and recall, but also enables real-time vulnerability evaluation of leaked data caused by SQL injection.
KW - GPU
KW - SQL injection attack
KW - network traffic
KW - regular expression
KW - web application firewall
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85075161797
U2 - 10.1109/TR.2019.2925415
DO - 10.1109/TR.2019.2925415
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:85075161797
SN - 0018-9529
VL - 69
SP - 188
EP - 202
JO - IEEE Transactions on Reliability
JF - IEEE Transactions on Reliability
IS - 1
M1 - 8771368
ER -