Abstract
In SAC'05, Strangio proposed protocol ECKE- 1 as an efficient elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman two-party key agreement protocol using public key authentication. In this letter, we show that protocol ECKE-1 is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. We also present an improved protocol - ECKE-1N, which can withstand such attacks. The new protocol's performance is comparable to the well-known MQV protocol and maintains the same remarkable list of security properties.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 149-151 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | IEEE Communications Letters |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 2008 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Diffie-Hellman protocol
- Elliptic curve cryptography
- Key agreement
- Key-compromise impersonation
- MQV