Bankruptcy and the cost of organized labor: Evidence from union elections

Murillo Campello, Janet Gao, Jiaping Qiu, Yue Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

46 Scopus citations

Abstract

Unionized workers are entitled to special treatment in bankruptcy court that can be detrimental to other corporate stakeholders, with unsecured creditors standing to lose the most. Using data on union elections, we employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of worker unionization on bondholders in bankruptcy states. Closely won union elections lead to significant bond value losses, especially when firms approach bankruptcy, have underfunded pension plans, and operate in non-RTW law states. Unionization is associated with longer, more convoluted, and costlier bankruptcy court proceedings. Unions depress bondholders' recovery values as they are assigned seats on creditors' committees.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)980-1013
Number of pages34
JournalReview of Financial Studies
Volume31
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Mar 2018
Externally publishedYes

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