Abstract
We revisit the identity-based (ID-based) key agreement protocol due to Ryu et al. The protocol is highly efficient and suitable for real-world applications despite offering no resilience against key-compromise impersonation (K-CI). We show that the protocol is also insecure against reflection attacks. We propose a slight modification to the protocol and prove its security in a widely accepted model.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 307-318 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Information Sciences |
| Volume | 179 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 16 Jan 2009 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Key agreement protocols
- Modular proof
- PKG forward secrecy
- Provable security
- Reflection attack