Abstract
In P2P applications, networks are formed by devices be-longing to independent users. Therefore, routing hotspots or routing con-gestions are typically created by an unanticipated new event that triggers an unanticipated surge of users to request streaming service from some partic-ular nodes; and a challenging problem is how to provide incentive mech-anisms to allocation bandwidth more fairly in order to avoid congestion and other short backs for P2P QoS. In this paper, we study P2P band-width game-the bandwidth allocation in P2P networks. Unlike previous works which focus either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investi-gates the game theoretic mechanism to incentivize node's real bandwidth demands and propose novel method that avoid congestion proactively, that is, prior to a congestion event. More specifically, we define an incentive-compatible pricing vector explicitly and give theoretical proofs to demon-strate that our mechanism can provide incentives for nodes to tell the true bandwidth demand. In order to apply this mechanism to the P2P distribu-tion applications, we evaluate our mechanism by NS-2 simulations. The simulation results show that the incentive pricing mechanism can distribute the bandwidth fairly and effectively and can also avoid the routing hotspot and congestion effectively.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2704-2712 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems |
| Volume | E96-D |
| Issue number | 12 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2013 |
Keywords
- Bandwidth allocation in P2P networks
- Congestion pricing
- Credit incentives
- Game theory
- Hotspot avoidance