Algebraic formalization and verification of PKMv3 protocol using maude

  • Jia She
  • , Xiaoran Zhu
  • , Min Zhang*
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

PKMv3 is the third version of Privacy and Key Management protocol, which plays an important role by providing key distribution and security access control in IEEE802.16m, the standard of Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access. The protocol should be guaranteed safe in terms of confidentiality, authentication and integrity. In this paper, we develop an executable formal specification of PKMv3 in an algebraic language called Maude and verify safety properties of the protocol using state exploration and LTL model checking in Maude. Unlike existing approaches, we consider the behaviors of intruders and time feature in our verification and verify both safety properties and time-related properties of the protocol.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - SEKE 2017
Subtitle of host publication29th International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering
PublisherKnowledge Systems Institute Graduate School
Pages167-172
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)1891706411
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017
Event29th International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, SEKE 2017 - Pittsburgh, United States
Duration: 5 Jul 20177 Jul 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, SEKE
ISSN (Print)2325-9000
ISSN (Electronic)2325-9086

Conference

Conference29th International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, SEKE 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPittsburgh
Period5/07/177/07/17

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