A novel and efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme

Hai Huang; Zhenfu Cao

doi:10.1109/LCOMM.2009.081880

A novel and efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme

Hai Huang
, Zhenfu Cao^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

An unlinkable secret handshakes is a two-party authentication protocol which protects the privacy of parties' affiliation and identity to everyone except for the intended parties. However, we find that the latest solution proposed by Jarecki et al. is not very efficient. In particular, each party requires O(log n) exponentiations where n is the number of parties affiliated with a single organization. In this paper, we propose a novel unlinkable secret handshakes protocol. Compared with Jarecki et al's scheme, our proposal is simple intuitionally and requires only constant exponentiations.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	363-365
Number of pages	3
Journal	IEEE Communications Letters
Volume	13
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/LCOMM.2009.081880
State	Published - 2009
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Forward security
Secret handshakes
Unlinkability

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10.1109/LCOMM.2009.081880

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KW - Secret handshakes

KW - Unlinkability

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A novel and efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme

Abstract

Keywords

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