非交互密钥协商综述

Key exchange protocol serve as a fundamental cryptographic primitive, traditionally involving participants in one or multiple communication rounds to establish a shared session key. However, the innovation of non-interactive key exchange protocols revolutionizes this process, allowing participants to derive a session key without direct communication. This feature is particularly valuable in scenarios where real-time interaction is impractical, making non-interactive key exchange a promising paradigm for secure communication channels, drawing significant attention from academic and industrial communities. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive survey of the developmental trajectory in the field of non-interactive key exchange protocols and the current unresolved challenges in this domain. In contrast to prior survey papers, our survey involves not only an in-depth examination of the evolution of traditional non-interactive key exchange protocols, but also partially non-interactive key exchange protocols which stem from message-layer secure protocols proposed by researchers affiliated with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Notably, these partially non-interactive key exchange protocols enable a group of participants to establish session keys in a (partial) non-interactive manner. This partial non-interactivity offers a nuanced perspective, especially beneficial in dynamic group communication scenarios. In such a scenario, when there is a dynamic change in participant composition within the group, only one participant needs to send a request message, while the others simply listen to it in order to complete the update of the group session key. Consider a scenario where there is a dynamic change in participant composition within the group. This process enhances the adaptability and security of group communication. Additionally, this paper introduces, for the first time, a potential solution for constructing multi-party non-interactive key exchange protocols based on asymmetric group key agreement which allows a group of participants to negotiate a public group encryption key and each participant's own unique decryption key. We note that, currently, the existing multi-party non-interactive key exchange protocols rely on complex cryptographic primitives such as multilinear mappings and indistinguishability obfuscation. Our innovative approach offers a new potential solution for secure non-interactive key exchange in scenarios involving multiple participants without the need for complex cryptographic primitives such as multilinear mappings and indistinguishability obfuscation. Finally, this paper explores the integration of blockchain technology as an extended component of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to mitigate potential risks in the design of non-interactive key agreement protocols. Specifically, within a non-interactive key exchange protocol based on PKI, a category of malicious behavior by adversaries, termed PKI attacks, is identified. In these attacks, an adversary has the capability to register an arbitrary public key in the PKI as the public key of a specific participant. This sophisticated form of attack not only undermines the trust of the PKI but also the security associated with non-interactive key exchange protocols. By leveraging blockchain technology, this approach enhances the security of participant public key registration, thereby mitigating the risk of adversaries manipulating the PKI and executing such malicious PKI attacks. In summary, non-interactive key exchange transforms secure communication, especially in dynamic group scenarios. This survey explores traditional and partially non-interactive protocols, introducing a novel multi-party solution and advocating blockchain integration to counter PKI attacks.